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In 1980 Congress responded to the inability of existing legislation
to deal effectively with the growing threat posed to society by
abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites' by passing the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).2 Since the Act's hurried enactment during
the waning days of the 96th Congress, courts have faced the
daunting task of interpreting CERCLA's complex statutory and
regulatory framework. The initial version of the statute was harshly
criticized as being poorly drafted,3 and despite a major legislative
* J.D. Candidate, 1996; B.A. University of California, Berkeley, 1992. i would like
to thank Professor Jeffrey M. Gaba for his comments on the manuscript of this Note.
1. See H.R. RPP. No. 1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-6125 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 1016(1)] (noting that the passage of
CERCLA was motivated by the discovery of old hazardous waste sites such as those at
Love Canal, New York, and the "Valley of the Drums" in Kentucky, and the inability of
existing legislation, namely the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), to
address properly such situations). See also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. EvTL. L. 1, 7 (1982) (citing Love Canal as impetus for Superfund Legislation).
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
3. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1995) (describing
CERCLA's "well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions").
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overhaul in 1986, 4 courts have found the statute "as inscrutable as
ever."
5
Nowhere have these interpretive problems been more pro-
nounced than in connection with CERCLA section 107(a)(3), which
imposes liability for hazardous waste cleanup upon parties who "ar-
ranged for [the] disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances."'6
Congress's failure to define the crucial term "arrange" in the provi-
sion left courts with little or no guidance as to its intended scope.7 Not
surprisingly, subsequent decisions have produced widely disparate in-
terpretations of section 107(a)(3) liability, especially with regard to
the potential liability attaching to commercial transactions in recycl-
able materials that either are, or contain, hazardous substances.8 The
line of demarcation between legitimate liability-exempt "sales" and
liability-inducing "arrangements for disposal" is often difficult to dis-
cern, resulting in ad hoc, haphazard decision-making by the federal
courts.9
The Ninth Circuit has not been immune to the problems posed by
the vague provision. 10 Faced with arguably contradictory precedents,
the Ninth Circuit recently established an apparently unprecedented
litmus test for determining when a party has "arranged for disposal"
of a hazardous substance. In Catellus Development Corp. v. United
States," the court held that the question of whether section 107(a)(3)
liability attaches to the sale of a hazardous substance turns on whether
the subject of the sale is defined as "solid waste" under the Environ-
4. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986).
5. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676, 681
n.6 (D. Mass. 1989). Frustration led one court to vent:
Depending on what definitions are accorded to various words and phrases within
the statute, sections, subsections, and even sentences within CERCLA seem to
contradict themselves with little or no internal consistency. Indeed those courts
which have attempted to unravel CERCLA's definitions have found no solace in
either the "plain meaning" of the statute or the reams of legislative history. In-
stead, in an attempt to glean legislative intent, courts seem to resort to a sort of
"Purkinje phenomenon," [ ]hoping that if they stare at CERCLA long enough, it
will burn a coherent afterimage on the brain.
CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1991).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
7. See United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989)
("Congress did not, to say the least, leave the floodlights on to illuminate the trail to the
intended meaning of arranger status and liability.").
8. See Robert C. Goodman, Wandering in the Wasteland, THE RECORDER (San Fran-
cisco), Sept. 13, 1994, at 6.
9. Id.; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Interpreting Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA: When
Has a Person "Arranged for Disposal?", 44 Sw. L.J. 1313, 1321 (1991) (stating that courts
have engaged in "ad hoc, case-by-case" evaluations of transaction).
10. Goodman, supra note 8, at 6.
11. 34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994).
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mental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations implementing the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA).12 This approach arguably creates
a much needed bright line for the determination of the potential liabil-
ity attaching to the sale of a hazardous substance under section
107(a)(3). But use of the EPA regulatory scheme in making this deter-
nuination is hardly free of problems. Indeed, because the breadth of
the rule could serve as a disincentive to recycling, support by commen-
tators has been less than unanimous.' 3 Moreover, several courts have
found such a limited approach to be inconsistent with the language of
CERCLA itself.14
Rising from the ashes of 1994's failed Superfund Reform Act,15
the Superfund Recycling Equity Act16 currently sits before Congress.
The proposed legislation could eliminate some of the problems associ-
ated with the section 107(a)(3) liability scheme and the Catellus rule.
Under the rubric of "recycling transactions," the Superfund Recycling
Equity Act would shield the sellers of certain "recyclable materials"
from liability under section 107(a)(3) in particular circumstances.17
Importantly, the Act provides clear standards for distinguishing a le-
gitimate recycling transaction from a liability-inducing arrangement
for disposal, something section 107(a)(3) fails to accomplish as it cur-
rently stands'18
12. Id. at 751. The current version of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA),
is codified as amended under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). RCRA subtitle C
establishes a prospective scheme regulating the management of hazardous wastes from
"cradle to grave." See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVRONMENTAL REGULATION 209,
224 (1992). Specifically, the subtitle C regulatory scheme applies to hazardous "solid
wastes." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1) (1994). The EPA's regulatory definition of "solid
waste" under RCRA subtitle C, found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1993), is the foundation for the
Catellus decision, the primary focus of this article. The courts often still refer to the statute
as the Solid Waste Disposal Act or the SWDA, while commentators and legislators gener-
ally refer to the statute as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or RCRA. For
purposes of clarity, this Note will refer to the statute as the SWDA, the acronym chosen by
the Catellus court.
13. Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
14. See State of California v. Summer Del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (finding that such a limitation to CERCLA arranger liability would be illogical);
CP Holdings Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., 769 F. Supp. 432,437 (D.N.H. 1991) (con-
cluding "there is no indication in the legislative history" that this approach is appropriate);
United States v. Farber, 1988 UL 25427 at *10 (D.NJ. Mar. 16, 1988) (finding such a nar-
row reading inconsistent with congressional intent); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 222 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (noting that the plain language of CERCLA
does not permit such a limitation).
15. The Superfund Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [here-
inafter H.R. 3800]; S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter S. 1834].
16. The Superfund Recycling Equity Act of 1995, H.R. 820, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter H.R. 820]; S. 607, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter S. 607].




This Note proposes the legislative adoption of the recycling ex-
emption to arranger liability for "recyclable materials" as proposed in
the Superfund Recycling Equity Act, and the judicial adoption of the
Catellus rule with regard to the sale of recyclables which are not legis-
latively exempted. Simultaneous adoption of the parallel rules will
provide courts with a comprehensive scheme for determining arranger
liability, and encourage responsible recycling without compromising
CERCLA's broad environmental goals. Part I provides a brief over-
view of CERCLA's structure, response mechanisms, and liability pro-
visions. Part II examines the courts' struggle to establish a coherent
doctrine for determining arranger liability. Part III focuses on the
Ninth Circuit's attempt to solve this problem, culminating with the
Catellus decision. Part IV examines the recycling "clarification" pro-
posal in this year's Superfund Recycling Equity Act19 and endorses its
adoption in conjunction with the judicial rule recently established by
the Ninth Circuit.
I. CERCLA Overview
A district court once observed that "[f]or fundamental and deeply
rooted psychological reasons, as well as more mundane utilitarian
considerations, it is characteristic of man to bury that which he fears
and wishes to rid himself of." 20 However, the court continued, "[i]n
today's industrialized society.., the routine practice of burying highly
toxic chemical wastes has resulted in serious threats to the environ-
ment and to public health."' In 1976 Congress responded to these
threats by passing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), an overhaul of the SWDA establishing a prospective
scheme regulating the management and disposal of hazardous
wastes.22 RCRA, however, failed to properly address an important
facet of the hazardous waste problem: abandoned and inactive haz-
ardous waste sites.23 A 1979 EPA study found between 30,000 and
50,000 such sites in the United States, at least 1200 of which posed a
serious threat to human health.24 Incidents such as the discovery of
19. See H.R. 820, supra note 16; S. 607, supra note 16, at § 3 (entitled "Clarification of
liability under CERCLA for recycling transactions").
20. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D.N.J. 1981) (Brotman, J.), affd,
688 F.2d 204 (1982).
21. Id.
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
23. While the RCRA's "imminent hazard" provision authorized abatement of an ac-
tive leak at a hazardous waste site, it did not authorize the EPA to take general remedial
cleanup action at abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites. See H.R. REP. 1016(I),
supra note 1, at 6124 (RCRA "is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent
they are posing an imminent hazard.").
24. Id. at 6120.
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the toxic quagmire at New York's Love Canal demonstrated the po-
tential gravity of the EPA's findings.25
In 1980 Congress directly addressed the "inactive hazardous
waste problem" by passing CERCLA.26 The comprehensive statutory
scheme authorizes and finances the cleanup of inactive and aban-
doned hazardous waste sites and establishes a broad liability scheme
to shift the costs of cleanup to the responsible parties.27
Specifically, CERCLA authorizes several methods of governmen-
tal response to threatened or actual releasez8 of a hazardous sub-
stance29 into the environment.30 Pursuant to CERCLA section 104,31
25. From 1930-1953, Hooker Chemical Company dumped approximately 22,000 tons
of 82 varieties of chemicals into the "Love Canal" in Niagra Falls, New York. Eventually,
the dump was capped and a lower middle class neighborhood grew in its place. By 1980,
Love Canal was a ghost town, its former residents suffering from ailments ranging from
birth defects to liver and chromosome damage. See Robert D. McFadden, Love CanaL" A
Look Back, N.Y. Tis, Oct. 30, 1984, at B6; Richard Roth, Long Buried Poisons Ooze
Out of the Ground, WASH. PosT, Aug. 5, 1978, at A2.
26. H.R. REP. 1016(I), supra note 1, at 6120.
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) defines "release" as follows:
[A]ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, inject-
ing, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the
abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes
(A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace,
with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of
such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling
stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source,
byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release
is subject to requirements with respect to financial projection established by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210],
or, for the purposes of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any
release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site
designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) defines "hazardous substance" as follows:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics iden-
tified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Con-
gress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with re-
spect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title
15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil and any fraction
thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
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the EPA may clean up the site itself in a manner consistent with the
terms of the National Contingency Plan (NCP).32 Alternatively, the
EPA may issue "such orders as may be necessary to protect the public
health and welfare and the environment. ' 33 This statutory language
permits the EPA simply to order someone, potentially anyone, to
clean up the contaminated site.34 Finally, under the language of sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B), private parties may take response action independ-
ent of the EPA and may recover necessary costs from liable parties
provided the costs prove "consistent with the National Contingency
Plan. 35
Section 107(a) 36 imposes liability for the costs incurred during the
cleanup of a contaminated site on four classes of individuals known as
"potentially responsible parties" (PRPs).37 They are as follows:
substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic
gas useable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C § 9601(14) (1988).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) defines "environment" as follows:
(A) the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean wa-
ters of which the natural resources are under the exclusive management authority
of the United States under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act [16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.], and (B) any other surface water, ground water,
drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the
United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1988).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
32. The NCP, promulgated by the EPA pursuant to CERCLA section 105, provides
procedures and standards for a proper cleanup operation. Currently codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1 (1994).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
34. Gaba, supra note 9, at 1315.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) reads, in part, as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of the disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dispo-
sal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
part or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
37. Gaba, supra note 9, at 1313.
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(1) the current owner or operator of the site;38
(2) any person who owned or operated the site "at the time of
[the] disposal of any hazardous substance";39
(3) any person who "arranged for disposal or treatment" 40 of
the hazardous substance disposed of at the site;
(4) and, under certain circumstances, any person who trans-
ported the hazardous substances to the site.41
An individual falling into one of the above four categories is subject to
strict liability.42 And, where environmental harm is indivisible, a
PRP's liability is joint and several.43
The language of section 107(a)(3) is inartfully drafted and inher-
ently more complex than the other section 107 liability provisions. The
designations of a past or present "owner or operator" and a "trans-
porter" are both specific and more easily conceptualized than one
who "arrange[s] for disposal or treatment." 44 Compounding the prob-
lem is the fact that despite providing definitions for "disposal" and
"treatment,"45 Congress inexplicably failed to provide a definition for
the crucial terms "arrange for" in the statute. This inherent ambiguity
and lack of guidance left the courts to formulate the meaning of sec-
tion 107(a)(3) on their own, which-as the next section demon-
strates-has proven to be a most difficult task.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
42. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with the
overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted [CERCLA] as establishing a strict
liability scheme."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
43. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
44. Robert E. Lannan, The Ever Expanding Scope of Liability Under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3): Is an End in Sight?, 20 N. Ky. L. Ruv. 75, 80-81 (1992).
45. CERCLA § 101(29) provides that the terms "disposal," "hazardous waste," and
"treatment," shall have the meaning provided in § 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[42 U.S.C. § 6903]. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29),
The SWDA defines "disposal" as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid
waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
The SWDA defines "treatment," when used in connection with hazardous waste, as:
any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change
the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous
waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous,
safer for transport, amendable [sic] for recovery, amenable for storage, or re-
duced in volume. Such term includes any activity or processing designed to
change the physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to
render it nonhazardous.
42 U.S.C § 6903(34) (1988).
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11. The Courts' Struggle to Interpret Section 107(a)(3)
Section 107(a)(3) liability clearly attaches to an individual who
disposes of hazardous waste at an off-site facility at which there is a
subsequent release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 46
But difficulties arise where a court is forced to distinguish between the
sale of a "product" containing hazardous substances-for which the
courts have generally found no liability-and a liability-inducing "ar-
rangement for disposal." 47 In the context of these "sale of a useful
product" transactions, courts have struggled to find a test consistent
with both the language and the remedial objectives of CERCLA.48
The so called "useful products" doctrine establishes that the "sale
of a new useful product containing a hazardous substance-as op-
posed to the sale of a substance merely 'to get rid of it"'-does not
give rise to CERCLA liability.49 Accordingly, courts have refused to
impose section 107(a)(3) liability for the sale of asbestos-containing
construction materials,50 the subsequent sale of a building containing
such materials, 51 the sale of new and used electrical transformers con-
taining hazardous polychloronated biphenals (PCBs),52 the sale of
wood treatment chemicals to a wood treatment facility,53 the sale of
PCBs for use as dielectric fluid in electrical equipment,5 4 the sale of
neoprene compounds for use in the manufacture of rubber goods,55
and the transfer of hazardous chemicals for use in electroplating, heat
treating, and waste water treatment.5 6
Conversely, courts have almost unanimously imposed liability on
the transfer of industrial byproducts or other waste for which the
seller had no further use, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction
46. See, e.g., United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp 757, 762 (N.D. Ga. 1989); see also
Gaba, supra note 9, at 1318.
47. Gaba, supra note 9, at 1318.
48. See, e.g., Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1575 (9th Cir.
1994) ("CERCLA is to be broadly interpreted to achieve its remedial goals.").
49. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. United States Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1254
(D.N.J. 1989).
50. Id.. Nor does the mere installation of such materials constitute "disposal." 3550
Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclay's Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1995).
52. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990)
(sale of new transformers); C. Greene Equip. Corp. v. Electron Corp., 697 F. Supp. 983
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (sale of used transformers with useful life).
53. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.),
affd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
54. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230, 1232
(S.D. Ind. 1983).
55. Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
56. AM Int'l. v. Int'l. Forging Equip., 982 F.2d 989, 998 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, there
was some question as to whether ownership of the chemicals at issue was actually trans-
ferred between the parties. Id. at 998 n.10.
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involved the sale of a substance in which the recipient placed residual
value.5 7 However, courts have utilized what can be described best as a
hodgepodge of factors in determining when liability attaches to trans-
actions in hazardous substances falling outside the shelter provided by
the "useful products" doctrine. Perhaps the most oft-cited of these
factors is what has been become known as the "crucial decision"
test.58 Born in United States v. A&F Materials Co.,59 the "crucial deci-
sion" test states that "[g]iven the scope of the language of 'otherwise
arranged' in [§ 107(a)(3)], the relevant inquiry is who decided to place
the waste into the hands of a particular facility that contains the haz-
ardous wastes ... [Liability] ends with that party who both owned the
hazardous waste and made the crucial decision how it would be dis-
posed of or treated, and by whom. '60
In A&F Materials, the government initiated a cost-recovery ac-
tion against McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) for costs in-
curred in the cleanup of A&F Materials' site in Greenup, Illinois.61
For a short period of time in 1978, MDC sold A&F Materials a caustic
solution that was a byproduct of MDC's production of jet fuel.62 A&F
Materials, in turn, would use the caustic solution as a neutralizer in it
oil reclamation process. 63 The government alleged that MDC was lia-
ble for cleanup costs because it "arranged for the disposal" of the
caustic solution. 64 After looking to the regulations implementing the
SWDA and determining that the caustic solution was a "waste," 65 the
court held that MDC had "arranged for the disposal" of the solution
by deciding to place it "in the hands of A&F Materials to be used and
disposed of at A&F's Greenup site."'66 While frequently cited in sup-
port of arranger liability,67 the "crucial decision" test has not been
universally accepted. 68
57. United States v. Maryland Sand, Gravel & Stone Co., No. HAR 89-2869, 1994 WL
541069, *12 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 1994). But see United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, 806
F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. I1. 1992) (imposing no liability for sale of commercial grade fly ash for
use in road construction).
58. Maryland Sand, Gravel and Stone Co., 1994 WL 541069 at *11-12.
59. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
60. Id. at 845.
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id. at 843-44.
63. Id. at 844.
64. Id. at 843.
65. Id. at 844-45. In doing so, the court relied on the EPA's 1980-1985 regulatory solid
waste definition. See infra notes 114-116.
66. Id. at 845.
67. See Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp.
1269, 1275 (E.D. Va. 1992); Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 241; United States v.
Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 157 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
68. Several courts have expressly rejected the "crucial decision" test. See Florida
Power & Light 893 F.2d at 1318 (noting that even though a "manufacturer does not make
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Courts have also disagreed as to whether a party must intend to
dispose of the hazardous substance by means of the sale at issue. Sev-
eral courts have looked to the motivation of the seller in determining
whether liability would attach to the sale of a given hazardous sub-
stance.69 Other courts, however, have refused to recognize such a re-
quirement, noting that to do so would require the court to ignore the
strict nature of CERCLA liability.70
Some courts have considered the seller's actual or imputed
knowledge of the disposal-like manner in which the product was to be
used. This factor seemed especially important in a recent Seventh Cir-
cuit decision. In G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Electric Co.,71 the court
found that arranger liability did not attach to the sale of an industrial
facility containing asbestos because the defendant "could not know
whether the sale of the 52 acre tract would ever result in the release of
asbestos fibers. That would depend on the buyer's intentions and how
these intentions were implemented." 72 In contrast, in New York v.
General Electric Co.,73 the court imposed liability based in part on the
seller's actual or imputed knowledge that the PCB-laden oil that was
the critical decisions as to how, when and by whom a hazardous substance is to be dis-
posed, the manufacturer may be liable"); Maryland Sand, 1994 WL 541069 at *12 (re-
jecting the "crucial decision" test as an appropriate basis for determining arranger
liability); see also Alice T. Valder, The Erroneous Site Selection Requirement for Arranger
and Transporter Liability Under CERCLA, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 2074 (1991) (criticizing the
"crucial decision" test).
69. In G.J. Leasing Co. v Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1995), the court
concluded, "[w]e may assume that had a primary purpose and likely effect of the sale ...
been to bring about the removal of asbestos in circumstances that would make the release
of fibers ... inevitable or at least highly likely, Union Electric could be found, through the
sale, to have disposed of, or arranged for the disposal of a hazardous substance." In fact,
the court categorized sales of hazardous substances as falling into three categories: 1) the
sale of a useful product; 2) "mixed-motive"; and 3) intentional disposal by subterfuge. Id.
The court distinguished Catellus as a mixed-motive case involving a degree of seller knowl-
edge. I&r See also Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1319 (finding no evidence "that
manufacturer intended to otherwise dispose of hazardous waste") (emphasis added); Kel-
ley, 739 F. Supp. at 360-61 (finding summary judgment inappropriate where motivation was
to dispose of waste); Edward Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 654-55 & n.3 (holding that the crucial
inquiry is the reason for the transaction); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895
(E.D.N.C. 1985) ("Ward clearly intended to have Bums 'get rid of' the PCB-laden oil
which had become a problem for him to maintain on WTC premises.") (emphasis added).
But see Catham Steel Corp. v. C. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 n.4 (N.D. Fla. 1994)
(refusing to read an intent requirement into the above language in Florida Power & Light).
70. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1985);
Catham Steel, 858 F. Supp. at 1138; United States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707, 724
(S.D. Ga. 1993); Prudential, 711 F. Supp. at 1254; Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 241;
States v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1183, 1184-5 (W.D. Pa.
1990).
71. 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
73. 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the subject of the transaction was to be spread on the ground as a dust
suppressant.74 Again, several courts have expressly indicated that such
knowledge is not a requirement for arranger liability.75
In the context of tolling agreements between chemical or pesti-
cide manufacturers and the formulators with whom they contract,
courts have found continued ownership of the materials by the manu-
facturer during the formulation process sufficient to trigger section
107(a)(3) liability for the costs associated with the contamination of
the formulator's facility.76 Seemingly important to the imposition of
liability in these cases was the fact that release or spillage constituted
an inherent part of the formulation process. 77 Indeed, one court em-
phasized the fact that the formulation contract at issue contemplated a
2% spillage of materials. 78
In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serns.,79 the Ninth
Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit's lead in United States v. Aceto Ag-
ricultural Chemicals Corp.80 and rejected arguments by the manufac-
turer defendants that they were not liable because they had no
authority to control the formulator's operations.81 But courts have not
necessarily ignored the measure of control the defendant has over the
party and the process responsible for the release.82 In United States v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.,83 the district court, while purporting to apply
the A&F Materials "crucial decision" test, found the defendant not
liable under section 107(a)(3) when it transported raw material to a
formulation facility and purchased the resulting product.84 In doing so,
the court emphasized that there was no indication that the defendant
"controlled or had the authority to control the hazardous substances
disposed or treated" at the site.85 In contrast, a district court has held
74. Id. at 297. Conservation Chem. may also fall into in this category. Gaba, supra
note 9, at 1324. There the seller knew the fly ash it was marketing was to be used to
neutralize waste and was later to be disposed of at a landfill. Conservation Chem., 619 F.
Supp. at 240-41. Reliance on this factor, however, is somewhat more difficult to discern
than in General Electri4 where the court emphasized the point.
75. Edward Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 656; Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895.
76. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
77. Jones-Hamilton, 973 F.2d at 695; Aceto Chem., 872 F.2d at 1379, 1381; Velsicol
Chem., 701 F. Supp. at 142.
78. Jones-Hamilton, 973 F2d at 695.
79. 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
80. 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 1381-1382.
82. Gaba, supra note 9, at 1324.
83. 729 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Del. 1990).
84. Id. at 1470-71.
85. Id. at 1471. While these courts have found "control" to be a factor in determining
liability, other courts have been quick to point out that "there is no such requirement."
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the government liable for cleanup costs under section 107(a)(3) based
on the level of control exercised during the production of rayon yarn
at the contaminated site during World War 11.86
Lastly, there has been some discussion by commentators that the
identity of the plaintiff may play a role. The government is apparently
more successful in obtaining relief in a cost-recovery action asserting
arranger liability than are private parties making similar arguments in
a contribution action.87 Several commentators believe this disparity
may be linked to a lack of sympathy for private parties who have the
option of allocating liability contractually through "hold harmless" or
indemnification clauses.88
In sum, section 107(a)(3) presents courts with a most difficult
task: distinguishing legitimate commercial "sales" from liability
tainted "arrangements for disposal." As the above discussion demon-
strates, the nation's federal courts have been unable to fashion a con-
sistent standard for doing so. Instead, liability determinations have
been made on what can best be described as an ad hoc, case-by-case
basis.
I. Searching for a Standard in the Ninth Circuit
Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit has struggled to formulate a
coherent standard for determining the scope of arranger liability. Un-
til recently, this area of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence was particularly
unclear due to two arguably inconsistent, if not contradictory,
decisions. 89
United States v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1183, 1185
(W.D. Pa. 1990).
86. FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa.
1992), affd, 29 F.3d 833 (1994). For a more detailed discussion of the FMC case see Lan-
nan, supra note 44, at 14-16. The Eighth Circuit recently endorsed this test with regard to
§ 107(a)(2) liability, but refused to extend it to arranger liability where the government had
the legal authority to control disposal and treatment, but failed to exercise such control.
See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995) (endorsing the new
"control" test for § 107(a)(2) liability determination, but finding lack of requisite control
by the government), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
87. Ferland & Marylyn D. Cage, Using RCRA to Interpret CERCLA Liability: What is
"Arranging for Disposal"?, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 445, 460-61 (1991) (contending that the
probability of successfully asserting § 107(a)(3) liability is significantly greater in govern-
ment action).
88. Id. The potential protection afforded a private party through such a contractual
arrangement is beyond the scope of this article.
89. See Goodman, supra note 8, at 6.
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A. The Stevens Creek Decision: The First Step Towards Catellus
In 3550 Stevens Creek Ass'n. v. Barclay's Bank of California,90 the
plaintiff building owner brought an action to recover costs incurred as
a result of voluntary asbestos removal during the remodeling of a
commercial building against the owner of the property at the time of
the installation of the asbestos-containing materials.91 The complaint
stated that by installing asbestos, the previous owner was in fact dis-
posing of a hazardous substance, thus exposing himself to potential
CERCLA liability under section 107(a)(2). 92
In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit laid much of the
groundwork for the rule ultimately announced in Catellus. As a first
step the court had to grapple with one of the glaring inconsistencies in
the plain language of the statute: the patently contradictory defini-
tions of "disposal" and "hazardous substance." Section 107(a)(2) im-
poses liability on a person who "at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such haz-
ardous substances were disposed of." 93 The term "hazardous sub-
stance" is defined in CERCLA with reference to substances
designated by the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the SWDA,
the Toxic Substances Control Act, as well as those substances desig-
nated by the administrator pursuant to CERCLA section 102.94 How-
ever, in defining "disposal,'! CERCLA cross-references the definition
from the SWDA.95 There, "disposal" is defined as the "discharge, de-
posit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid
waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such
solid waste or hazardous waste... may enter the environment. '96
Asbestos, designated as a "toxic pollutant" under the Clean
Water Act, a "hazardous air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act, and
a "hazardous substance" under section 102 of CERCLA, unquestiona-
bly qualifies as a hazardous substance as defined in CERCLA section
101(14).97 But when installed as insulation and fire retardant in the
construction of a building, asbestos is not a solid or hazardous waste
as defined in the SWDA or the regulations promulgated by the EPA
90. 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).
91. Id at 1356-57.
92. Id. at 1358; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). See supra note 36 for the text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). See supra note 29 for the text.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988). See supra note 45 for the text.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 45 for the text.
97. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1360 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1317; 42 U.S.C. § 7412; 40
C.F.R. pt. 122, app. D, tbl. V (1987); 40 C.F.R § 401.15 (1987); 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, subpt. M
(1987); 40 C.F.R § 302.4, tbl. 302.4 (1987)). Currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988);
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988); 40 C.F.R. pt. 122, app. D, tbl. V (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1994);
40 C.F.R. pt. 61, subpt. M (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, tbl. 302.4 (1994).
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thereunder.98 The plaintiff argued that the language of section
107(a)(2), imposing liability for the disposal of hazardous substances,
prevailed over the definition of disposal borrowed from the SWDA
which is limited to solid or hazardous wastes.99
When faced with this predicament, several other courts have de-
cided that the liability provisions for the disposal of a hazardous sub-
stance in sections 107(a)(2) and (3) are not limited to transactions in
solid or hazardous wastes by the limited definition of disposal incor-
porated into CERCLA from the SWDA. To do so, according to one
court, would "completely ignore the plain language" of the statute'00
and, according to another, "would serve to make portions of CER-
CLA moot or contradictory.'' In Stevens Creek itself, Judge Preger-
son adhered to this view in his dissent, arguing that the "questionable
proposition that 'disposal' refers only to the placement of 'hazardous
wastes,' not of 'hazardous substances' . . . fails to take into account the
very language of the statute which refers repeatedly to the 'disposal of
hazardous substances."' 02
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988) (defining solid waste as "any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control
facility and other discarded material"); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988) (defining hazardous
waste as solid waste or combination of solid wastes posing a particular threat to human
health or the environment); 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a) (1994) (defining solid waste as "discarded
material" which is "abandoned ... recycled ... or inherently wastelike").
99. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362.
100. United States v. Farber, 1988 WL 25427 at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1988).
101. CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., 769 F. Supp. 432, 436 (D.N.H.
1991); see also State of California v. Summer Del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). Interestingly, the Summer Del Caribe court was forced to make a tortured read-
ing of the Stevens Creek decision in order to avoid coming to the opposite conclusion.
There, the defendant argued that the Stevens Creek court limited the scope of liability
under § 107(a)(2) to the disposal of wastes as defined in the SWDA, and in dictum indi-
cated that the same analysis was to be applied to potential § 107(a)(3) transactions. Sum-
mer Del Caribe, 821 F. Supp at 579. Indeed, this seems to be the plain meaning of the
Stevens Creek decision. See Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 479-80 (noting that the
"court made it clear" that liability under § 107(a)(2) or § 107(a)(3) is to be construed iden-
tically with respect to the act at issue). Judge Pregerson, in dissent in Stevens Creek, also
understood the majority decision this way. See Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1366 n.5 (Preger-
son, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Summer Del Caribe court refused to reach this con-
clusion because "[sluch a reading would be illogical in light of the use of the word
'hazardous substance."' Summer Del Caribe, 821 F. Supp. at 579. To avoid this problem,
the court limited Stevens Creek to its facts:
[A] close reading of Stevens Creek reveals that ... the Ninth Circuit did not
intend its decision to be read as defendant urges. The Stevens Creek court was not
asked to decide whether a hazardous substance must be a "hazardous waste"
under the SWDA for disposal liability under CERCLA to attach. Rather, it was
deciding whether installation of insulation containing asbestos constitutes
"disposal."
Id.
102. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1366 n.5 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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But the Stevens Creek majority took the road less traveled. "On
its face," they reasoned, "'disposal' pertains to 'solid waste or hazard-
ous waste,' not to building materials which are neither. ' 10 3 After not-
ing that the section 107(a)(2) and (3) incorporated the same definition
of 'disposal,' the court, citing several of the section 107(a)(3) "useful
product" cases as authority,10 4 explained that disposal referred "only
to an affirmative act of discarding a substance as waste, and not to the
productive use of the substance."'1 05 Because asbestos, when used as a
building material, could not be characterized as "discarded mate-
rial.., abandoned ... recycled.., or inherently wastelike," liability
could not be predicated on section 107(a)(2).10 6
B. The ASARCO Decision: Charting a Different Course
In Stevens Creek, the Ninth Circuit seemed to indicate that the
scope of arranger liability would be limited to transactions in solid
wastes as defined by the SWDA and the EPA regulations promul-
gated thereunder. 0 7 However, the court changed course in early 1994
The Farber court employed a clever analogy to make this point. Assume there was a
Federal Fruit Statute which made it illegal for one to peel a fruit in public. "Fruit" is de-
fined within the statute to include apples, oranges, bananas, plums, and peaches. The stat-
ute, however, does not define "peel," but, instead, directs the reader to another statute, the
Federal Orange Statute. Within the Federal Orange Statute "peel" is defined as:
"holding the orange in one hand and pulling back its skin from the center to
expose the inner portion of the orange."
Would [defendant] then argue that one would only be liable under the Fed-
eral Fruit Statute if they peeled an orange? ... Such a narrow reading completely
ignores the plain language of the Fruit Statute.
Farber, 1988 WL 25427 at *9-10.
Notably, the definitions of "disposal" and "treatment" in the now defunct Superfund
Reform Act of 1994 would have cured this apparent inconsistency. Section 606(6) would
have amended the definition of disposal in § 9601(29). The new definition would still have
cross-referenced the RCRA definition "except that the term 'hazardous substance' shall be
substituted for the term 'hazardous waste' in the definitions of 'disposal' and 'treatment."'
H.R. 3800, supra note 15, at § 606(6).
It is worth noting here, however, that such a change was not necessary, as the utiliza-
tion of the SWDA's definition of "solid waste" to determine the scope of the phase "ar-
range for disposal" does no violence to the language of the statute. Both § 107(a)(2) and
(a)(3) are limited to acts of "disposal." As one court pointed out: "[H]ow can a manufac-
turer arrange for the disposal or treatment of anything but a waste?" Edward Hines Lum-
ber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685. F. Supp. 651, 654 n.2 (N.D. Il1. 1988), affd on other
grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). The limitation on liability complained of by these
courts is thus inherent in the language of the statute itself. See infra note 181.
103. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1361.
104. Prudential 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.NJ. 1989); Edward Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 651;
Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.L 1987); Westing-
house, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1230.
105. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362.
106. Id. at 1361; 40 C.F.R § 261.2(a) (1993).
107. See Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 480-481.
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in Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO. 108 For more than half a century,
ASARCO ran a copper smelting plant near Tacoma, Washington.10 9
The process, which separates copper from copper ore, produces large
amounts of byproduct known as slag." 0 During the early 1970s
ASARCO began marketing its slag as "ballast" for log yards through
a middleman corporation known as Black Knight. 1' The log yards
would lay the slag like gravel in order to provide firmer ground for the
use of heavy equipment and the storage of logs." 2 When a load of slag
became too diluted with wood waste and other debris to serve its in-
tended purpose, it would be collected and sent to a local landfill." 3
The log yard would then lay a new load of slag in its place." 4
In 1980 the EPA discovered heavy metal contamination in the
water runoff from one of the log yards." 5 State investigation soon de-
termined that the copper slag sold by ASARCO was the likely cul-
prit." 6 By the time the Washington Department of Ecology formally
began to require cleanups in 1986, contamination from ASARCO slag
had been discovered at five additional log yards as well as the local
landfill. 117 ASARCO's liability as an arranger soon became an issue,
as the owner of the log yards sought both response costs for the
cleanup of its own log yards and indemnity or contribution for the
response costs associated with the cleanup of the landfill." 8 The dis-
trict court found ASARCO liable on the CERCLA claims." 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that the sale of the slag
constituted an "arrangement for disposal," despite a jury determina-
tion that the slag was a "product with intrinsic value" under the Wash-
ington Products Liability Act (WPLA).120 The court found that the
slag could simultaneously constitute a "product" under the WPLA
and a "waste" for the purposes of CERCLA.' 2' However, in deter-
mining that the slag sales were in fact arrangements for the disposal of
a waste, the court emphasized three factors: (1) the slag was an indus-
trial byproduct, (2) that had nominal commercial value, and (3) was
108. 24 F.3d 1565 (9th Cir. 1994).








117. Id. at 1570 n.1.
118. Id. at 1571.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1574; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.72.010-7.72.060 (West 1992 & Supp.
1995).
121. 24 F.3d at 1575.
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something that the producers wanted to "get rid of."'122 In using these
three factors, the Ninth Circuit seemed to enunciate a new test for
making the all important determination of when a substance is a
"waste" for purposes of statutory arranger liability under
CERCLA.'23 ,
The origin of these factors proves very interesting indeed. Rather
than looking to the EPA's definition of solid waste under the SWDA,
as had been suggested by Stevens Creek dictum, the ASARCO court
relied heavily on the district court decision in A&F Materials.124 In the
penultimate paragraph on the issue, the court, quoting A&FMaterials,
stated:
In deciding whether this was a waste disposal for CERCLA pur-
poses, the [A&F Materials] court said "the definition of waste was
intended to cover those hazardous materials which are of nominal
commercial value and which were sometimes sold or reused and
sometimes discarded."'12
The definition of waste to which the A&F Materials court was refer-
ring was in fact the 1980-1985 EPA definition of solid waste under the
SWDA."-6 Thus, in deriving its three factor test, the ASARCO court
was in essence applying the test suggested by the Stevens Creek court.
But in doing so, the court relied on an earlier, substantially different
version of the suggested definition. 7 Thus, the ASARCO decision
left the Ninth Circuit with two definitions of "waste" for purposes of
determining arranger liability: one based on the current regulatory
definition of solid waste, and the other derived from an earlier regula-
tory definition of the same. 128
C. The Catellus Decision: A Bright Line Analysis?
Catellus Development Corp. v. United States129 provided the
Ninth Circuit with the opportunity to reconcile the arguable differ-
ences between Stevens Creek and ASARCO. Depending on how the
Catellus opinion is interpreted, the court may or may not have done
so. The litigation involved more than six million dollars in response
costs incurred by Catellus during the required cleanup of its Point Isa-
122. ki
123. Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
124. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
125. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575 (quoting A&F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 842) (empha-
sis added).
126. See A&F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 844 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1993)).
127. Cf. 1 JOHN-MIARK STENSVAAG, HAzARDous WASTE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.9-
2.11, with 1 STENSVAAG, supra, at §§ 3.1-3.49.
128. Despite the disparity between the two definitions, the outcome in ASARCO
would have been the same under either test, as the copper slag would also have qualified as
a solid waste under the current regulatory scheme.
129. 34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994).
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bel property in Richmond, California. 130 The property and surround-
ing bay waters had been contaminated by lead from crushed lead-acid
battery casings dumped at the site. 131 A substantial portion of the cas-
ings had been dumped at the Point Isabel property by a battery re-
claimer, Morris P. Kirk & Sons, Inc. (MPK). 132 MPK reclaimed lead
from dead lead-acid batteries obtained through various sources.' 33
General Automotive's (General) Grand Auto Parts Stores were one
source, selling MPK the dead batteries they received from customers
as trade-ins. 34 Accordingly, Catellus sought to hold General, among
others, liable for response costs as a statutory "arranger."' 135
Each side claimed one of the two aforementioned Ninth Circuit
decisions to be dispositive on the issue of liability. The defendant
placed talismanic significance on the language of Stevens Creek relat-
ing to "productive use."'1 36 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued
that under ASARCO, the sale of any byproduct by nature constituted
an "arrange[ment] for disposal.' 37 Neither argument prevailed.
Instead, the court returned to the path suggested by Stevens
Creek, considering the dispositive issue to be whether the batteries
could be characterized as "solid waste" under the SWDA regulatory
definition.' 38 Accordingly, the court looked at the "regulations imple-
menting SWDA to explain the scope of the term 'waste' as it informs
the definition of 'disposal' in CERCLA."'1 39 Realizing that a return to
this approach appeared patently inconsistent with the approach taken
in ASARCO, the court made several attempts at reconciliation. First,
the court noted that ASARCO was distinguishable from Stevens Creek
in that ASARCO involved the sale of a byproduct rather than the sale
of a principle business product.' 40 The court then limited ASARCO to
its facts: namely, a situation where "the byproduct being sold will have
to continue to be used in its identical state until it is disposed of.' ' 4 '
Lastly, the court explained that the use of the SWDA regulations was
130. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 764,766 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd,




134. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 749.
135. Id.
136. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362 (explaining that disposal refers "only to an affirm-
ative act of discarding a substance as waste, and not to the productive use of the sub-
stance."). Relying in part on this argument, the district court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Catellus, 828 F.Supp. at 768.
137. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 751.
138. Id. at 750.
139. Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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not inconsistent with the approach taken by the ASARCO court be-
cause ASARCO was based on A&F Materials,142 which itself relied on
the EPA regulations implementing the SWDA.' 43
Before turning to the regulations themselves, the court first had
to determine which regulations applied-"the current ones or those in
force at the time of the charged acts." 144 Given the retroactive nature
of CERCLA liability, the court determined that it was proper to apply
the current regulatory solid waste definition to section 107(a)(3) con-
struction regardless of when the actual contaminating acts occurred.145
The court then turned to the current regulations under the
SWDA for "a more detailed discussion of when a recycled material
should be considered a waste."' 46 The regulations define solid waste
as any discarded material which is "[a]bandoned... [r]ecycled... or
[c]onsidered inherently wastelike."' 47 An exception to this broad rule
exists for recycled products "[u]sed or reused as ingredients in an in-
dustrial process to make a product, provided the materials are not be-
ing reclaimed .... ,14 As the regulations clearly include the recovery
of lead values from spent batteries as reclamation, General's batteries
fell outside this narrow exception, and were thus "solid waste.' 49
The Catellus court rounded out its treatment of disposal by dis-
cussing the transaction in terms of ASARCO. The court noted that the
battery casings, as opposed to the lead plates found therein, were
something that General would have needed to get "rid of."' 5 0 The
court also cited ASARCO in rejecting General's assertion that lack of
control over the eventual disposition of the battery casings absolved
them of liability.' 5'
Finally, the court rejected the assertion that General was liable as
a party who arranged for the treatment of the batteries. 5 2 The court,
basing its analysis on the plain language of the statute, explainedithat
142. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575.
143. A & F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 845.
144. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 751.
145. i
146. Id.
147. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis omitted).
148. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e).(1994).
149. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 752 (construing 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(4) (1993), which cites
recovery of lead values from spent batteries as an example of reclaimed material). The
court also relied on United States v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993), which found
that spent batteries reasonably constituted waste under the EPA regulations. Catellus, 34
F.3d at 752.
150. Id.; cf. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575 (finding that a by-product could be considered
both a "product" and "waste" if composed of "materials it's producers wanted to get rid of
whether they could sell them or not").
151. 34 F.3d at 752.
152. Id. at 753.
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for liability to attach under the treatment provision, the treatment
must have taken place at the cleanup site itself.'5 3 Because the
cleanup was not at MPK's battery-cracking facility, but rather at Cat-
ellus' Point Isabel property, treatment liability could not attach to the
transaction. 5 4
Finding the sale of dead lead acid batteries to a battery reclaimer
to be an arrangement for disposal for the purposes of section
107(a)(3) is not a novel concept. Numerous courts have found liability
in similar situations. 155 The hallmark of the Catellus decision could be
the method taken in achieving this result. However, whether such a
bold statement can be made depends on how Catellus is interpreted,
both in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere.
Catellus could be read to create a bright line rule limiting liability
under section 107(a)(3) to transactions in materials containing hazard-
ous substances that fall within the EPA's current regulatory definition
of "solid waste." At least one commentator has tentatively understood
the decision to create such a rule.'5 6 However, if the decision did cre-
ate such a rule, it hardly did so with model clarity. First, the language
used by the court is patently ambiguous. The Catellus court found the
regulations "useful" in that they "give us a more detailed discussion of
when a recycled material should be considered a waste."'1 57 This is
hardly the powerful language one would expect from a court estab-
lishing a bright line rule. Moreover, if Catellus is to be read as creating
such a rule, it is unclear why the court found it necessary to garner
"further support" for its holding by recasting its decision in terms of
ASARCO. 158 As discussed above, the ASARCO factors were derived
from the EPA's earlier regulatory definition of solid waste.159 Given
the court's determination that the current regulations rather than the
regulations in force at the time of the charged acts controls the dispo-
sal determination, ASARCO should have been expressly disapproved.
153. Id.
154. Id. The case was remanded to the district court for trial on the issue of arranger
liability in accordance with the decision. Il
155. See Catham Steel Corp. v. C. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1994); Chesa-
peake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992);
United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992). In Catellus, the district court
found dispositive the fact that in Pesses, Peck Iron, and Catham Steel the reclaimer's facility
itself was the subject of the cleanup, whereas in Catellus the cleanup was at a third prop-
erty, notably one with which General had "no direct connection." Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at
771.
156. Goodman, supra note 8, at 7 ("[Tlhe relevant inquiry would appear to be limited
to a determination of whether the material that is the subject of the transaction is a solid
waste, within the broad definition of the SWDA.").
157. 34 F.3d at 750-51.
158. Id. at 752.
159. See supra notes 124-126.
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Instead, ASARCO arguably provided an alternative basis for the Cat-
ellus holding.160 In light of the ambiguous language used, and the ad-
ditional reliance on the ASARCO rule, it can easily be argued that
Catellus merely established the use of -the current SWDA regulations
as a nonexclusive means of determining when an item has the all im-
portant characteristics of "waste" for the purposes of section 107(a)(3)
liability. Worse, the Catellus decision could be read to set forth two
rules: one that requires examination of a current regulatory scheme,
and another that sets forth factors derived from a repealed scheme.
Nevertheless, language in a subsequent unpublished disposition
by the same panel seems to bolster the argument that the Catellus
court intended to create the limiting bright line rule. n United States
v. Montana Refining Co.,' 61 the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded
the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment
in light of the Catellus decision. While the district court "properly ana-
lyzed the [disposal] issue by asking whether the... [hazardous recycl-
able] should be classified as discarded waste according to the
approach of section 1004 of the SWDA," it failed to "look to the regu-
lations of SWDA in the detail... recently approved in Catellus... to
determine when recycling constitutes an arrangement for disposal or
treatment of discarded waste."' 62 In fact, the disposition went on to
label the use of the current SWDA regulations a "rule" established by
Catellus that was to be followed. 63 Unfortunately, the court was not
nearly as lucid in published form, leaving open the question of
whether Catellus in fact broke with convention and established the
aforementioned rule. 64 For the purpose of argument, this Note will
160. Catellus, however, did apparently limit ASARCO to its facts. See supra note 141.
161. No. 93-16583, 1994 WL 444632 (9th Cir. 1994). Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 limits use
of this disposition for precedential purposes. Nevertheless, for argumentative purposes it
demonstrates the potential intent of the panel that decided Catellus.
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id.
164. Courts have long been wary of establishing bright line rules in this area of CER-
CLA jurisprudence. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., the court "re-
ject[ed] any attempt to establish a per se rule in determining a manufacturer's liability
under CERCLA." 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Douglas County v. Gould,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (D. Neb. 1994) ("There is no bright line between a sale and a
disposal ... ."); Gaba, supra note 9, at 1320-21 (describing case-by-case approach taken by
a majority of courts in this area). Accordingly, Catellus could truly be unique if it in fact
established such a bright line approach. Perhaps due to the Ninth Circuit's lack of clarity
and simple precedential inertia, subsequent out-of-circuit decisions have not yet inter-
preted Catellus to set forth the limiting bright line rule. The Seventh Circuit came closest,
and its interpretation underscores the ambiguity of Catellus. In G.J. Leasing v. Union Elec.
Co., the court understood the finding of liability in Catellus to be based on General's
knowledge that part of the batteries would eventually have to be disposed of. 54 F.3d 379
(7th Cir. 1995). Finding this basis to be too broad, the court stated, "[p]erhaps the limiting
principle is supplied by a regulation of the EPA, on which the court relied, which provides
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proceed under the assumption that Catellus did in fact limit arranger
liability to transactions in goods containing hazardous substances that
fall under the SWDA's definition of solid waste.165
D. The Catellus Rule in Practice
Before any evaluation can be made with regard to the prudence
of the apparent new rule, its actual nuts and bolts must be explored.
The facts of Catellus required the court merely to graze the surface of
the current SWDA regulations defining solid waste. Indeed, all that
was required was an examination of three brief regulatory provisions.
The spent lead acid batteries were solid waste in that they were
"[a]bandoned . . . [r]ecycled . . . or [c]onsidered inherently waste-
like.' 66 The batteries did not fit into an exemption for recycled
materials "used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to
make a product"'167 due to the fact that the materials needed to be
"reclaimed."168
This relatively simple analysis, however, belies the incredible
complexity of the EPA's current regulatory definition of solid
that materials sold to reclamation ... are to be deemed hazardous waste." ld at 384. In
Douglas County, the court understood Catellus as nothing more than a reiteration of the
basic principle of Stevens Creek "The [Catellus] court held that 'disposal' necessarily in-
cludes the concept of waste and because spent batteries could be defined as waste, General
could be held liable for arranging for their disposal." 871 F. Supp. at 1246. The Douglas
County court failed to mention the regulations at all. Had the court done so, it may well
have reached the same result. In Douglas County, defendant reclaimed the lead plates
from within spent batteries and sold the plates to a secondary smelter "in lieu of lead ore."
Id. at 1244. As the materials had already been reclaimed, they would no longer have been
regulated as solid waste under the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2) (1994); Jeffrey
M. Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat,
16 EcOLOGY L.Q. 623, 640 (1989) ("In fact, reclaimed secondary materials are regulated as
solid wastes only between the time they are generated and the time they are inserted into
the reclamation process.").
165. If Catellus did not create such a rule, but merely established the use of the SWDA
regulations as a nonexclusive means of determining the dispositive issue of when a sub-
stance is waste, it did little to bring clarity to this area of the law. The unnecessary use of
the ASARCO factors late in the opinion could indicate that more than one analysis may be
used by Ninth Circuit courts to determine when a substance is "waste." If so, the decision is
hardly remarkable, joining the rank and file of cases setting forth individual factors for
consideration in the determination of arranger liability. Viewing this as a possibility, Good-
man states, "Following Catellus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when a sale
will lead to CERCLA liability." Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
166. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis omitted).
167. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e) (1994).
168. "A material is reclaimed if it is processed to recover a useable product, or if it is
regenerated. Examples are recovery of lead values from spent batteries and regeneration
of spent solvents." 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(4) (1994).
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waste. 169 The definition itself covers more than a page and a half in
the Code of Federal Regulations170 and has spawned substantial litiga-
tion in the federal courts.17' The types of transactions at issue in this
Note, namely those in the gray area between clear "disposal" and the
sale of a new product containing a hazardous substance, would be cov-
ered by a subset of the regulatory solid waste definition for "secon-
dary" materials. Full examination of this area, with which the EPA has
struggled for decades,172 is well beyond the scope of this Note.
Nevertheless, the following is a brief summary of the EPA regula-
tions governing secondary materials as they stand. 7 3 First, a recycl-
able material cannot be a solid or hazardous' 74 waste unless it is one
of four types of "secondary materials" or a commercial chemical prod-
uct.1 75 Once the material is identified as falling into one of these five
categories, the inquiry turns to the way in which the material is re-
cycled. The above listed material may be solid waste when recycled in
169. The EPA's initial promulgation of the definition of solid waste required a fifty-
four page preamble. 50 Fed. Reg. 614 (1985). John-Mark Stensvaag, in his treatise HAZ-
ARDOUS WAsTE LAW AND PRACICE, states that "the current regulatory solid waste defini-
tion is as complex as anything in the law of hazardous waste." 1 STENSVAAG, supra note
127, at § 3.1, S-46. Stensvaag provides a complex flowchart for determining when a mate-
rial is a solid waste that is admittedly substantially different from that provided by the
EPA. 1 id. at § 3.1, 3-4 to 3-5. Stensvaag finds the explanation provided by the EPA to be
inadequate, although he notes that the existing regulatory definition is so complex that no
flowchart would be perfect. 1 id. at § 3.1, 3-6 n.12. For an excellent summary see Gaba,
supra note 164.
170. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1994).
171. See Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
172. 1 STENSVAAG, supra note 127, at § 3.1, S-46. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Ameri-
can Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987), could be read to throw much
of this regulatory scheme into question, limiting the solid waste category to materials irre-
futably abandoned under a subjective intent standard. 1 STENSVAAG, supra note 127, at
§ 2.6A, S-18 to S-19. However, the EPA has chosen to take a very limited view of the
decision and the changes mandated by this limited view have a "final agency action" date
of [00/00/00]. 1 id. at § 2.6A, S-21 to S-23; 55 Fed. Reg. 45134, 45181 (1990).
173. This summary is based in large part on the summary provided in Gaba, supra note
164 and Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 470-75. For a detailed analysis of the regulatory
solid waste definition see 1 STENSVAAG, supra note 127, at ch. 3 & 4.
174. Hazardous wastes are a subset of solid waste. See 41 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988) (de-
fining hazardous waste as solid waste or a combination of solid wastes posing a particular
threat to human health or the environment). Under the SWDA regulations, a solid waste
may be categorized as a hazardous waste in one of two ways. The EPA may classify a solid
waste as hazardous by "listing" the particular material. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1994). A
solid waste is also classified as a hazardous waste if it exhibits certain hazardous character-
istics such as reactivity, corrosivity, ignitability, or toxicity. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24
(1994); see also Gaba, supra note 164, at 625 n.15.
175. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(1) (1994) (defining "spent materials"); 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.1(c)(2) (1994) (defining "sludges"); 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(3) (1994) (defining "byprod-
ucts"); 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(6) (1994) (defining "scrap metals"); 40 C.F.R § 261.33 (1994)
(defining "commercial chemical products").
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one of four specific ways.176 That is, "the same material can be a waste
if it is recycled in certain ways, but would not be a waste if it is re-
cycled in other ways."'1 77 The regulations provide a matrix that
matches the materials with the recycling methods, leaving some com-
binations outside the definition of solid waste.178 Under the matrix,
use of a recycling method which "resembles disposal, storage, or treat-
ment of hazardous waste" increases the likelihood of regulation as a
solid waste.179
This definition is limited somewhat by a set of exemptions, exclu-
sions and variances, both statutory' 80 and regulatory. 181 Direct use of
unreclaimed secondary materials to make a product, or as an effective
substitute for a commercially available product, and the return of such
materials to the original or primary process from which they were gen-
erated in lieu of raw materials are all generally excluded from regula-
tion as solid waste.182 These general exemptions may be denied by the
EPA for two reasons. First, even these generally exempted materials
are regulated where they are used as fuel, applied to land, or specula-
tively accumulated. 183 Additionally, the EPA may deny the exemption
upon the conclusion that the recycling activity is actually a sham. 184
The regulations are rounded out by exemptions for materials desig-
nated as exempt, or excluded, by congressional or EPA decision, and
potential individual exemptions based on a case-by-case variance
procedure.185
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1) (1994) (used in a manner constituting disposal); 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(2) (1994) (burned for energy recovery); 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3) (1994)
(reclaimed); 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(4) (1994) (accumulated speculatively).
177. 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 619 (1985).
178. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 tbl. 1 (1994). For example, commercial chemical products are
not solid wastes when reclaimed.
179. Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 472.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988) (excluding materials such as domestic sewage and
radioactive waste).
181. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a) (1994) (exempting certain materials that are effectively
regulated by other federal programs, and materials which the EPA believes were never
intended to be regulated as waste); 40 C.F.R. § 260.31(a)-(c) (1994) (granting variances
under certain conditions with respect to substantially reclaimed materials, speculatively
accumulated materials, and reclaimed and reused materials).
182. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(i)-(iii) (1994).
183. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(2)(i)-(iii) (1994). But see 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(2)(B)(ii)
(1994) (stating that commercial chemical products are not waste when applied to land in
their ordinary uses or when used as fuel where they are themselves fuel).
184. Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 472. The criteria are discussed by the EPA in
the preamble to the regulations. 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 637-640 (1985). For example, recycling
may be deemed a sham when the material is only marginally effective for its intended use
or is used in amounts greater than is necessary for that purpose. Ferland & Cage, supra
note 87, at 472.
185. See supra note 173.
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Courts and commentators alike agree that these regulations are
both complex and confusing. 186 Nevertheless, several of these critics
have endorsed the step apparently taken by the Catellus court. 187 The
advocates argue that, while not perfect, the use of the SWDA regula-
tions to determine the scope of section 107(a)(3) liability is the best
solution available under the current version of CERCLA. 88 They
may well be right.
Adoption of the Catellus rule would allow courts and potential
litigants alike to reference a reasonably coherent pre-established set
of factors for determining section 107(a)(3) liability. In bringing a de-
gree of predictability to the area, adoption of the rule could eliminate
much of the incentive to litigate. 189 Additionally, adoption the Catel-
lus rule, which focuses solely on the nature of the material involved in
the transaction and its use, could make it more difficult for courts in
the future to avoid the merits and make liability determinations based
on the identity of the plaintiff.190
These benefits, however, could result from the adoption of any
bright line rule in an area so plagued with ad hoc decision making.
Thus, supporters of the Catellus rule focus on the fact that the adop-
tion of such a rule comports with the express language and the implied
meaning of section 107(a)(3),' 91 as well as its sparse legislative his-
186. See supra note 164.
187. See Gaba, supra note 9, at 1329. Specifically, Professor Gaba endorses a test that
attaches arranger liability to the sale of a solid waste containing a CERCLA hazardous
substance. Id. at 1328 & n.90. Ferland & Cage concur:
A simple explanation of the use of the words 'hazardous substance' in combina-
tion with the words 'disposal' and 'treatment' in section 107(a)(3) is that the use
of those terms was intended to require that a transaction must involve an arrange-
ment for the.., disposal of a waste containing hazardous substances before that
action can create liability.
Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 474. As discussed earlier, the Catellus court did not have
to reach this second step in the analysis because the hazardous nature of the batteries was
not in dispute. It can only be assumed that had the court faced this issue, it would have
ruled accordingly.
188. See Gaba, supra note 9, at 1329; Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 475-76.
189. See id. at 481. This indeed would be a welcome change in a system plagued with
litigation costs. More than one third of the 11.3 billion dollars spent on Superfund sites by
the private sector through 1991 funded litigation. See Reform Bills Would Increase Some
Suits, Decrease Overall Litigation, Study Says, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Aug. 2, 1994)
(citing RAND Superfund study).
190. Ferland & Cage, supra note 87, at 481.
191. See Gaba, supra note 9, at 1326-28 (arguing that common sense dictates that one
can only "dispose" of "wastes"); cf. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
685. F. Supp. 651, 654 n.2 (N.D. Ill.) ("[H]ow can a manufacturer arrange for the disposal
or treatment of anything but wastes?"), affd, 861 F.2d 155 (1988). The fact that "disposal"
is defined in terms of "waste" by the statute bolsters this argument. See supra notes 95-96
and accompanying text.
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tory.192 Such a rule apparently would also be consistent with existing
case law. With certain notable exceptions, 193 the transactions to which
the courts have attached section 107(a)(3) liability have generally in-
volved materials which would fall within the EPA's broad definition of
solid waste.194 Likewise, transactions in which liability was not found
generally did not involve materials constituting solid waste. 95
In defining solid waste, the regulations distinguish products from
wastes, including in the latter secondary materials when recycled in
ways which denote a disguised intent to dispose.196 Thus, while
designed for a different purpose, the regulations provide a coherent
framework for courts to distinguish the sale of a legitimate product
from a transaction that constitutes an arrangement for disposal. In ad-
dition to the administrative benefits, use of the broad SWDA regula-
tions to determine the scope of arranger liability would arguably
effectuate CERCLA's environmental concerns and its indisputable re-
medial purpose.197 For these reasons, adoption of the Catellus rule
would constitute a dramatic improvement over the historical ad hoc
approach taken by courts in determining liability under section
107(a)(3).
Additionally, despite the complaints of several courts, see supra notes 100-102, this
approach does no violence to § 107(a)(3)'s reference to the disposal of "hazardous sub-
stances." The rule utilizes the solid waste definition to determine the scope of the word
"disposal." This is not the same as limiting arranger liability to the sale of "hazardous
wastes" as defined in the SWDA, as "hazardous wastes" are a subset of "solid wastes," not
their equivalent. See supra note 174. Rather, the Catellus court determined that one can
only "dispose" of a "solid waste." Accordingly, the sale of any such material containing a
"hazardous substance" gives rise to arranger liability. As Professor Gaba points out, "[t]his
category is still far broader than the class of hazardous wastes defined in [the SWDA]."
Gaba, supra note 9, at 1326.
192. The legislative history discusses the need to focus on generators who "create haz-
ardous wastes ... and ... determine whether and how to dispose of these wastes." S. REP.
No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980).
193. The materials involved in the chemical formulator cases (Aceto, Jones-Hamilton,
and Velsicol) clearly fall outside the SWDA definition of solid waste. However, there is a
strong argument that the manufacturers in these situations should have been held liable as
an "owner or operator" under § 107(a)(2) rather than an "arranger" under § 107(a)(3). See
Gaba, supra note 9, at 13, 28 n.100.
194. See supra Part II; see also Gaba, supra note 9, at 1328. But see United States v.
Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. II1. 1992) (no liability for sale of commer-
cial grade fly ash for use in road construction).
195. See Gaba, supra note 9, at 1328; see also, e.g., Douglas County v. Gould, 870 F.
Supp. 1242 (D. Neb. 1994).
196. Gaba, supra note 9, at 1328; see also 1 STENSVAAG, supra note 127, at § 3.9 p. 3-23
(the categories of secondary materials subject to regulation are "designed to exempt from
solid waste status primary products, co-products, and unrestricted raw materials . .
197. See supra note 48.
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IV. The Catellus Rule: Criticism and a Legislative
Alternative
Despite these potential benefits, the sheer breadth of the regula-
tions proves problematic in using them to define the boundaries of
CERCLA arranger liability. As one commentator has noted,
"[v]irtually any material, under the right circumstances, can fall within
the definition of solid waste. ' 198 Indeed, with narrow exceptions for
certain materials recycled in certain ways,1' recyclable materials fall
within the EPA's definition for solid waste.200 Under Catellus, then,
CERCLA arranger liability will attach to a significant number of
transactions involving recyclable materials.201 While this result argua-
bly effectuates CERCLA's broad remedial environmental purposes, it
also creates a disincentive to recycling.202
Proponents of a broad CERCLA liability scheme disagree. In
general, they argue, the breadth of the CERCLA liability scheme has
produced strong incentives for industry to improve its management of
hazardous waste both through waste minimization and careful selec-
tion of transporters and disposal facilities that will not produce future
CERCLA liability.203 One district court argued that section 107(a)(3)
liability is not a disincentive to recycling altogether, but rather encour-
ages responsible recycling.204 Indeed, as the court noted, a broad lia-
bility provision such as that established by Catellus may merely
require recyclers to "diligently scrutinize the facilities to which they
198. Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
199. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
200. See 40 C.F.R § 261.2(a)(2) (1994) (defining solid waste as a material that is aban-
doned, recycled, or considered inherently wastelike) (emphasis added).
201. Goodman, supra note 8, at 7 (explaining that this will especially be true with re-
gard to the sale of scrap metal and industrial byproducts). Needless to say, Catellus sets the
same standard with regard to recyclable lead-acid batteries.
202. "[M]any materials which can be properly recycled are now not being captured for
reuse because of Superfund liability exposure." 141 CONG. Ruc. $4492, S4506 (1995)
(statement of Senator Warner). See also Roberta G. Gordon, Legal Incentives for Reduc-
tion, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous Waste Managemen4 95 YALE
L.J. 810, 826 n.105 (1986) (blaming the failure of North Carolina's "waste exchange" in
part on waste generators' fear of arranger liability under CERCLA, and proposing liability
exemption for sale to a bona fide purchaser through a "waste exchange"); Goodman, supra
note 8, at 7 (stating that after Catellus, the "rule" in Ninth Circuit for sale of used products
is "seller beware").
203. The Superfund Reform Act of 1994: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Committee on the Envi-
ronment and Public Works on S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Hon. Tom
Udall, Attorney General, State of New Mexico, on behalf of the National Association of
Attorneys General) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENCY, A PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT ON Tm INDIRECr EFmEcrs OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM (May 20, 1992)).
204. United States v. Maryland Sand, Gravel & Stone Co., No. HAR 89-2869, 1994 WL
541069, *53 n.26 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 1994).
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send their wastes.., and demand assurances from recyclers that they
will dispose of the ... residues in an environmentally conscientious
manner."
205
While this may be so, a broad interpretation of section 107(a)(3),
such as the Catellus rule, provides no protection for even the most
diligent and scrupulous seller of hazardous recyclables. Should the
materials contribute to a site requiring cleanup, the seller will be
jointly and severally liable.20 6 Echoing these concerns, the Superfund
Recycling Equity Act of 1995207 would afford just such protection to
sellers of certain recyclable materials under the proper circumstances.
In an effort to promote the reuse and recycling of scrap material,
"level the playing field" between new and recycled materials, and re-
move the disincentives and impediments to recycling due to potential
liability, proposed CERCLA section 127 would create a new CER-
CLA provision "clarifying" the status of certain recycling transactions
with regard to arranger liability.208 Under the bill, if certain criteria
are met, the sale of scrap paper, plastic, glass, textiles, rubber, metal,
and spent lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, and other batteries would be
deemed "arrangements for recycling" and thus exempt from liability
under section 107(a)(3). 20 9 The proposed qualifying criteria vary, de-
pending on the specific material involved, and look to both the nature
of the material itself and the nature of its use.210
Certain requirements, however, would be common to all "recycl-
able materials."'211 In order to qualify for the liability exemption, the
material in question would have to meet a certain commercial specifi-
205. Id.
206. See supra note 43.
207. H.R. 820, supra note 16; S. 607, supra note 16.
208. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 2 (creating CERCLA § 127 and stating its purposes).
209. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(q) (defining "recyclable materials" for purposes
of the exemption-this list also includes minor amounts of material incident to or adhering
to the scrap material as a result of normal and customary use prior to becoming scrap); id
at § 127(a) (exempting the sale of "recyclable materials" from liability under § 107(a)(3)
and (4)); see also S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(a)(2) (defining "recyclable materials"; id.
at § 127(b)(1) (creating liability exemption).
Adoption of a liability exemption for certain recycled materials would not be entirely
unprecedented. Currently, CERCLA § 114(c) exempts service station dealers from ar-
ranger and transporter liability arising form the release or threatened release of recycled
oil, so long as the oil is not mixed with any other hazardous substance, and is managed in
accordance with SWDA regulations and other applicable law. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c)(1)
(1988). The provision also exempts all such dealers, except for the current owner or opera-
tor, or the owner or operator at the time of the disposal of the hazardous substance, from
an EPA abatement order under CERCLA § 106.
210. This, according to the House Report accompanying the defunct Superfund Re-
form Act, contained an essentially identical provision. H.R. REP. No. 582(11), 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 358 (1994); Goodman, supra note 8, at 7.
211. Id.
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cation grade.212 Additionally, the party seeking the exemption would
have to demonstrate that a market exists for the material.213 On the
use side of the equation, the provision requires that a substantial por-
tion of the material be made available for use in the making of a new
saleable product, and that the material, or the product made there-
from, be able to serve as a substitute for virgin raw material or a prod-
uct made from such raw material. 21 4 For future transactions, the
provision further guards against sham sales by requiring the seller to
exercise "reasonable care" to determine whether the recipient is in
compliance with all substantive provisions of applicable environmen-
tal laws, regulations, and orders pertaining to the management of the
material.21 5
Sellers of scrap metal and spent batteries would be subject to cer-
tain additional requirements. Beyond the general requirements men-
tioned above, the seller of scrap metal would have to demonstrate
compliance with regulations concerning the recycling of such scrap
212. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(1); S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(b)(2)(A).
213. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(2); S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(b)(2)(B).
According to the Senate report on the Superfund Reform Act, which contained an essen-
tially identical provision, proving the existence of a market was required to show that the
sale was an arms length transaction amongst the parties. S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 160 (1994) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 349]. A party could satisfy this requirement by
demonstrating a history of trade by unrelated parties in the material in question. This re-
quirement was one of several specific provisions guarding against "sham" transactions. Id
214. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(3)-(4); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(b)(2)(C).
215. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(5); S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(b)(2)(E).
The proposal also contains a nonexclusive list of factors for a court to use in determining
whether such "reasonable care" was used. They are: (1) the price paid in the transaction;
(2) the seller's ability to discern the nature of the recipient's activities; and (3) the result of
inquiries made to appropriate State, Federal, or Local agencies about the recipient's past
and current compliance with relevant substantive provisions of relevant laws and regula-
tions. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(6); S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(b)(5). The
proposal would afford slightly different treatment to transactions occurring prior to ninety
days after the provision's enactment. With regard to these past transactions, the exemption
would not be available if the seller had an "objectively reasonable basis to believe" that the
recipient was not in compliance with applicable law or regulation. H.R. 820, supra note 16,
at § 127(f)(1)(A)(iii); S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(1)(A)(iii). Again, a nonexhaustive
list of criteria is provided for the determination of whether there was such an objectively
reasonable basis. They are: (1) the size of the seller's business; (2) customary industry prac-
tices; (3) the price paid in the transaction; and (4) the ability of the seller to detect the
nature of the recipient's operations with regard to the handling, processing, reclamation or
management activities connected with the material. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 129(0(2);
S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(c)(2). The stricter standard for future transactions is inten-
tional. In future transactions, sellers would presumably be aware of the compliance re-
quirement, encouraging them to take affirmative actions to ensure the materials are going
to legitimate facilities. By contrast, a past seller could not choose to send his or her materi-
als to a different facility after the enactment of the provision. S. REP. No. 349, supra note
213, at 162.
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metal subsequently promulgated by the EPA under the SWDA. 216 In
addition, the scrap metal could not have been melted prior to the
sale.217 Sellers of lead-acid batteries would be subject to a similar re-
quirement of compliance with EPA regulations regarding the storage,
transport, management, and other activities associated with the re-
cycling of such batteries, currently found at 40 Code of Federal Regu-
lations section 266.80.218 Recyclers of nickel-cadmium and other spent
batteries would have to await promulgation of similar regulations by
the EPA for the recycling of such batteries before they could take
advantage of the liability exemption.219
The proposed liability exception also includes several common
safeguards against sham recycling. The exemption is not to be avail-
able where the seller has an "objectively reasonable basis to believe"
that the material will not be recycled, or that the material will be
burned as fuel, for energy recovery, or for incineration. 20 The re-
cycling exemption would also be inapplicable if the seller either adds
hazardous substances to the material, other than for processing pur-
poses, or fails to handle or manage the materials with reasonable
care.221
Adoption of the above described amendment could dramatically
improve CERCLA's current treatment of transactions in hazardous
recyclables in several ways. Substantively, it would help achieve twin
environmental goals. The liability exemption would encourage re-
cycling, thereby furthering the goals of waste minimization and natu-
ral resource conservation. 222 And the stringent standards for the
216. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(d)(1)(B); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(b)(2)(F)(i). Prior to such promulgation by the EPA, a seller of scrap metal could
qualify for the exemption by meeting the other qualifications for scrap metal, assuming
there was no other exclusion. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 349, supra note 213, at 166.
217. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(d)(1)(C); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(b)(2)(F)(ii). "Melting" was not to include the thermal separation of two or more
materials due to differences in melting points, known as "sweating." H.R. 820
§ 127(d)(1)(C)(2); S. 607 § 127(b)(3).
218. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(e)(1)(B)(i); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(b)(2)(G)(ii); 40 C.F.R. § 266.80 (1993). In addition, the Senate bill requires that the
seller did not first recover the valuable portions of the battery. S. 607 § 127(b)(2)(G)(i).
219. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(e)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(b)(2)(G)(iii)-(iv); see also S. REP. No. 349, supra note 213, at 168.
220. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). The criteria for determining an "objectively reasonable basis" are to
be the same as described in connection with past transactions in recyclable materials. See
supra note 215.
221. H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 127(f)(1)(B)-(C); S. 607, supra note 16, at
§ 127(c)(1)(B).
222. See H.R. 820, supra note 16, at § 2; S. 607, supra note 16, at § 2. The legislative
history contains the following examples: the use of recycled steel results in a 90% reduction
in use of virgin materials, a 40% reduction in water use, a 76% reduction in water pollu-
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exemption would ensure that such recycling is conducted responsibly,
accordingly reducing the possibility that later remedial action under
CERCLA would be necessary. Procedurally, the proposal provides
courts with clear guidelines for handling transactions in certain recycl-
able materials. The congressional guidelines in the provision are spe-
cific and coherent.2- The adoption of these uniform standards could
bring some much needed predictability to decisions, thereby reducing
the incentive to litigate.22 4
But the scope of the proposed recycling provision is to be limited
to transactions in certain specific materials. Without a companion rule,
transactions in other recyclable materials will continue to suffer an
uncertain fate at the hands of the federal courts and their ad hoc ap-
proach to arranger liability.2 This problematic dichotomy could be
cured by pairing the recycling exemption from the Superfund Re-
cycling Equity Act with the rule announced by the Ninth Circuit in
Catellus. By coupling the two rules, courts and potential litigants alike
will have the benefit of parallel comprehensive schemes for prospec-
tive pretransaction decisions, prelitigation settlement decisions, and,
ultimately, liability determination.
tion, and a 97% reduction in mining waste over the use of virgin raw materials. 141 CONG.
REc. E269-05, *E270 (1995). Recycling is far more energy efficient than the production of
virgin materials: 95% for aluminum, 80% for plastics, 75% for iron and steel, and 64% for
paper, respectively. Id
223. The language of the bill seems quite clear. It contemplates exempting the sale of
certain material by a "person" to a" consuming facility." A "consuming facility" is one at
which the material is "handled, processed, reclaimed, or otherwise managed by a person
other than a person who arranges for the recycling of the recyclable material." S. 607, supra
note 16, at § 127(a)(1). This language, on its face, would exempt from liability the sale of
the secondary material to the facility at which it is to be processed (where necessary), as
well as the sale of the processed material to the manufacturer as a raw material (a transac-
tion which would not usually require the exemption. See Douglas County v. Gould, Inc.,
871 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Neb. 1994). Bolstering the argument that the former sale is to be
covered is the fact that under the Senate bill, batteries must be sold intact in order to be
entitled to the exemption. S. 607, supra note 16, at § 127(B)(2)(G)(c). Unfortunately, am-
biguous statements made on the floor of Congress cloud the framers' intent: "This [bill]
does not affect the liability for contamination that is created at facility owned and operated
by a recycler." 141 CONG. REc. E269-05, *E270 (1995) (statement of Congresswoman Lin-
coln). "[O]nly bonafide recycling facilities benefit from this bill." Id Similar statements
from the Senate prove equally cryptic. But if the "recycler" in the statements merely means
the seller (or the "person" as worded in the legislation), these statements comport with the
plain wording of the bill. So read, they simply mean that the exemption provides no shelter
to the recycler from owner or operator liability with regard to contamination of its own
facility.
224. Cf. Ferland & Cage, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
225. See 141 CONG. REc. E269-05, *E270 (1995) (statement of Congresswoman Lin-
coln) ("However, my CERCLA bill does not address or exempt chemical solvent, sludge,
or slag recycling.").
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Conclusion
Widespread judicial recognition of the Catellus rule, coupled with
legislative adoption of the Superfund Recycling Equity Act's recycling
exemption, could simultaneously encourage responsible recycling and
lessen the incentives to engage in costly litigation, without doing vio-
lence to CERCLA's broad remedial goals. While congressional action
on the issue is uncertain at this time, nationwide judicial adoption of
the Catellus rule would, at the very least, bring some much needed
clarity to the "murky realm" of CERCLA arranger liability.
